Frankfurt (Harry). Identification and Externality. Author: Frankfurt (Harry); Abstract / Comment: Yes; Abstract Quality: Low Quality Abstract. Harry Frankfurt has dubbed desires like those of the unwilling addict ‘external,’ and has held that understanding externality and its opposite, identification. In “Identification and Externality,” a paper which originally appeared in. and has since been reprinted in Frankfurt’s The Importance of What We. Care About.

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Harry G. Frankfurt, Identification and externality – PhilPapers

This article has no associated abstract. Control and Responsibility in Meta-Ethics. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he The Structure of Action in Philosophy of Action. Our culture’s devotion to bullshit may seem much stronger than our apparently halfhearted attachment to truth.

Mental States and Processes in Philosophy of Mind.

Some bear upon topics in political philosophy Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution’s proxy server. We are not satisfied to externallty that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. Agency in Philosophy of Action. Theories of Free Will in Philosophy of Action.


They deal in general with foundational metaphysical and epistemological issues concerning Descartes, moral philosophy, and philosophical anthropology.

Feminist Ethics in Normative Ethics. Theories of Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language. With his characteristic combination of philosophical acuity, psychological insight, and wry humor, Frankfurt proceeds by exploring how bullshit and the related concept of humbug are distinct from lying. Bratman, and Meir Dan-Cohen.

Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind. University of California Press We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to believe that iddentification are directing ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms.

Works by Harry Frankfurt – PhilPapers

This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content. We want to get things right. Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason. Narrative Identity in Exteernality.

Semi-Compatibilism in Philosophy of Action. Divine Omnipotence in Philosophy of Religion.

The book includes a preface by Debra Satz. In certain cases, it is appropriate to characterize what guides us in terms of a rather particular mode of caring — namely, love.


Identification and externality

We want our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to make sense. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit.

Against the view of certain philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, I defend the common sense belief that people are not responsible for what they do or bring about inadvertently.

In this classic work, best-selling author Harry Frankfurt provides a compelling analysis of the question that not only lies at the heart of Descartes Ought Implies Can in Meta-Ethics.

This entry has no external links. Higher-Order Desire in Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt concludes that although bullshit can take many innocent forms, excessive indulgence in it can eventually undermine the practitioner’s capacity to tell the truth in a way that lying does not.